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Transparency in International Investment Law:
The Good, the Bad, and the Murky
Julie A. Maupin1

Transparency is the buzzword du jour within international investment law. Oft invoked and
seldom defined,2 it slides like butter on toast across the debates saturating nearly every facet of
the international legal regime governing foreign direct investment. How can we improve the
content of investment treaties? Introduce more transparency into the negotiating process.3 What
can be done to reduce the mounting public criticism of investor-state arbitration? Make the
investor-state dispute resolution process and the institutions that support it more transparent.4
Of course, few would deny that transparency is generally a good thing. It is necessary to the
functioning of any democratic means of organizing our cooperative relations, whether social or
economic, domestic or international.5 But transparency is not a panacea. As in all things,
context matters. We must ask ourselves not only whether transparency is desirable within
international investment law, but also transparency in respect of what and vis-à-vis whom? Only
in light of the answers to these questions can we begin to fulfill the present book’s mandate of
querying the degree to which the international investment regime may manifest an existing or
evolving international law norm of transparency.
I approach the task in four parts. I begin by considering how the complex and decentralized
nature of the international investment law system complicates the quest for transparency from
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the outset by both proliferating and obfuscating the lines of communication through which
information flows. I then adopt a rough working definition of transparency that is appropriate to
this multifarious environment, emphasizing the availability, accessibility, usability and relevance
of the information for all affected stakeholders. In part II, I construct a framework for evaluating
the status of the posited transparency norm within the international investment law (IIL) system.
This framework identifies transparent, semi-transparent, and non-transparent aspects of the
system and examines the major types of information falling within each category. I demonstrate
that these do not necessarily map onto prevailing normative judgments concerning what might
constitute good, bad, and murky transparency practices. Part III sketches a few strategies that
might be explored in future prescriptive analyses of transparency questions. Part IV concludes
with a tentative assessment of the penetration, recent evolution, and likely trajectory of
transparency principles within the contemporary international investment law regime.
I.

What does it mean to examine transparency in international investment law?

Before broaching the topic of transparency, it is first necessary to specify the domain of inquiry.
What precisely is the international investment law ‘system’ or ‘regime’? There is no simple
answer to this question. In contradistinction to other international legal regimes – such as those
associated with the World Trade Organization, International Labor Organization, or United
Nations – international investment law has no hierarchy, no central organizing body, and no
historical genesis or originating document commonly acknowledged by all. It is clearly not a
‘regime’ in the strict constitutional sense. Rather, as I have argued elsewhere,6 the only
practicable way to identify international investment law is by its constituent elements:
1) Textually, the regime is a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of around 3000 overlapping bilateral and
regional treaties,7 tens of thousands of transnational contracts, and an unknown number
of domestic statutes8 whose purported aim is to stimulate economic development by
attracting and protecting foreign investments within the sovereign territories of individual
host states.9
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2) Substantively, it is a half-dozen or so vaguely worded but relatively standardized legal
principles constraining the permissible actions of sovereign governments in their dealings
with foreign investors.10
3) Institutionally, it is a handful of competing arbitration-related institutions and their
associated sets of procedural rules for investor-state dispute resolution.11
4) Jurisprudentially, it is an ever-growing body of decisions through which ephemeral
arbitral tribunals interpret and develop the substantive law of international investment.12
To make this description more concrete, consider three hypothetical manifestations of
international investment law. In scenario one, a Russian investor relies on a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) to claim compensation from the United States for enacting a new environmental
law, which the investor claims has unfairly and inequitably diminished the value of its
investment. The claim is heard by an international arbitral tribunal functioning under the
UNCITRAL arbitration rules,13 with institutional support provided by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. The final award is enforceable under the New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.14 In scenario two, a Chinese investor brings a
claim of uncompensated expropriation against the government of Côte d'Ivoire pursuant to the
latter’s domestically enacted investment statute. An international arbitral tribunal functioning
under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
hears the claim, applying the ICSID rules of arbitration. The tribunal’s final award is governed
by and enforceable under the ICSID Convention.15 In scenario three, a Saudi investor brings a
claim for breach of contract against the government of Vanuatu pursuant to a concession
agreement between the two parties. The claim is heard by an international arbitral tribunal
constituted under the auspices of the International Chamber of Commerce and applying the ICC
arbitration rules. The final award is subject to enforcement under the domestic laws of the
jurisdiction(s) where enforcement is sought, as Vanuatu is not a party to an applicable
international enforcement convention.
In such a world, it is difficult to fathom how one might begin to trace the content and
pervasiveness of any single overarching transparency norm. Simple combinatorics would
10
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suggest that an impossibly large number of transparency norms would be required to cover all of
the potential permutations of legal texts, substantive rules, and institutions that might arise. By
way of counterpoint, the WTO system allows for legal challenges based upon varied causes of
action. But these must be state-to-state challenges, must arise under one of only 16 treaties,16
and must be settled in accordance with a single dispute settlement mechanism, applying a single
set of rules and overseen by a single administering institution. Expanding the lens to include
regional and bilateral trade relations adds about 300 additional treaties to the picture 17 – around
one tenth the number involved in the IIL regime – not counting the latter’s incorporation of
investor-state contracts and domestic investment statutes.
Yet, somehow, the center holds. The IIL regime indeed operates as a ‘system’ – complex and
decentralized, to be sure, but neither anarchic nor disorganized.18 To understand why, one must
look beyond international law’s traditional pillars of inquiry19 and give due consideration to two
additional constituent elements of the IIL regime:
5) Politically, it is a collection of actual and potential stakeholders – some individual and
some corporate (including investors, states, and civil society) – who either have been or
believe that they may one day be impacted in some way by the functioning of the IIL
regime.
6) Sociologically, it is a particularized epistemic community comprised of arbitrators,
counsel, experts, scholars, institutional employees, journalists, treaty negotiators,
government advisors, and a select few knowledgeable civil society advocates – all of
whom are connected to one another by a revolving door which facilitates frequent and
facile movement between these roles.20
I have examined these elements in detail in other work.21 For present purposes, it suffices to
note that the fifth and sixth elements of the IIL system are interrelated in two important ways.
First, there is a discernible overlap between some – though not all – of the actors inhabiting the
political and sociological spheres. Second, actions taken within the political sphere often
provoke reactions within the sociological sphere, and vice versa. The mechanism of influence
differs, however. In the political sphere, the mechanism of influence is direct and overt; it occurs
through the exercise of an actor’s right to influence policy decisions. In the sociological sphere,
the mechanism is indirect and sometimes covert; it takes place through the actor’s ability
(independent of any associated right) to influence policy developments.
16
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By way of illustration, members of a given country’s private arbitration bar may exercise
domestic political power when making submissions to their own government concerning a
proposed transparency-related amendment to that country’s model BIT. Some of these same
individuals may in turn exercise sociological power when deciding (while acting as arbitrators,
counsel, or expert witnesses) within the context of particular investor-state arbitrations how to
address transparency questions arising in proceedings involving other, similarly worded
treaties.22 Even these mechanical boundaries between the two realms may blur at times. Several
governments have recently appointed members of their private arbitration bars to represent their
states’ national interests before the ongoing intergovernmental UNCITRAL Working Group on
proposed transparency-related amendments to the UNCITRAL arbitration rules.23 In such
instances, it becomes unclear which mechanism – political or sociological – is actually at work.
What is clear from this discussion, however, is that any investigation of transparency within
international investment law must pay heed to the many different forms and faces it can take. It
must also devote sufficient attention to the individuals and groups whose joint and separate
activities are shaping the system’s trajectory. As it happens, a considerable number of
practitioners, arbitrators, and academics straddle the international investment and international
commercial arbitration worlds. This is understandable, since both systems embrace privately
initiated claims and non-judicial dispute settlement options. Yet it would be a mistake to treat
the two systems alike for purposes of any transparency inquiry.
Commercial arbitration principally involves ordinary contract claims whose resolution has little
impact beyond the disputing parties and their immediate affiliates. 24 IIL disputes, by contrast,
often involve challenges to generally applicable regulatory measures enacted by host state
governments for public purposes.25 Their resolution can therefore impact upon the public at
large by limiting the scope of – or alternatively setting the price for – states’ exercise of their
sovereign regulatory powers. In such circumstances it is essential to examine the regime’s
transparency norms not only in view of its multiplicity of texts and institutions but also in light

22
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of the interests of a broad spectrum of stakeholders – including the general public – against the
backdrop of contemporary democratic governance norms.26
In recognition of these facts, I will adopt herein a modified version of the single-treaty-based
conception of transparency originally suggested by Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell. For present
purposes, transparency means:
‘The adequacy, accuracy, availability, and accessibility of knowledge and
information about the policies and activities of [the international investment law
regime and its participants], and of the central organizations [functioning within]
it on matters relevant to compliance and effectiveness, and about the operation of
the norms, rules, and procedures [underlying the regime].’27
Three features of this rough working definition merit attention. First, it is intentionally open
with respect to subject matter scope (transparency in respect of what?) and intended addressees
(vis-à-vis whom?) This allows it to be flexible enough to function in a multitude of contexts.
Second, the definition is equal parts objective and subjective. It calls for information to be not
only ‘available’ but also ‘accessible’, ‘adequate’, ‘accurate’, and ‘relevant’. Each of these terms
can be specified, but their precise specification will vary according to the number and type of
stakeholders whose interests may be implicated in each context.28
Third, it is important to recognize what this conception of transparency excludes. In
emphasizing information about the operation of the IIL regime, I omit two related but distinct
phenomena – namely participation rights and accountability mechanisms. I do so to remain
faithful to the present book’s objective of shedding light on the meaning of transparency qua
transparency. Moreover, I do so to underscore that the debate over the appropriate form and
content of transparency norms within international investment law cannot be reduced to the
parallel debate over amicus curiae participation in investor-state arbitration proceedings.29 Nor
should it be conflated with the ongoing discussions as to how best to make investor-state dispute
26
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resolution more politically accountable to various key constituencies 30 and how to increase the
IIL regime’s stability, predictability, and legitimacy overall.31 Transparency plays an
instrumental role in all of these debates, but it also has an inherent value which transcends them.
Focusing on transparency for its own sake can thus help to advance our understanding on
multiple fronts simultaneously.
II.

The IIL regime’s three levels of transparency

Beginning with this information-centric notion of transparency, the next step is to map out the
present state-of-the-art. What follows is not a comprehensive discussion of every facet of the
system.32 Rather, the aim is to flesh out a conceptual framework that can help to facilitate more
detailed future analyses of the IIL regime’s key transparent, semi-transparent and nontransparent features. As with all labeling exercises, sorting information into these categories
entails making both descriptive and normative judgments. In what follows I shall try to be
explicit about these as and when they arise.
A. Transparent aspects of the IIL regime (things generally known or easy to discover)
First, some heartening news: we actually know a great deal today about the functioning of the
IIL regime, or at least, a great deal more than in the past. In respect of foundational texts, the
major multilateral conventions that serve as the cornerstones of the system – namely, the ICSID
and New York Conventions – have always been matters of public record. The same is true of a
large proportion of the investment regime’s more than 3000 bilateral and regional treaty texts
granting substantive protections to foreign investors and/or placing national or international
enforcement mechanisms at their disposal. Advances in information technology have made most
of these treaties accessible to anyone with an internet connection. 33 Country-specific
transparency practices, meanwhile, now ensure the ready availability of many states’ unilateral
investment promotion statutes.34 As a result, with the important exception of investor-state
30

See eg Brigitte Stern, ‘L’entrée de la société civile dans l’arbitrage entre Etat et investisseur’, Revue de l’arbitrage
2 (2002), p. 329; and José Alvarez, ‘Why are We “Re-calibrating” our Investment Treaties?’, World Arbitration and
Mediation Review 4(2) (2010), pp. 143-62.
31
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‘Enhancing the Legitimacy of International Investment Law: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations of a New
Public Law Approach’, Virginia Journal of International Law 52 (2011), pp. 57-102 (and references cited therein).
32
Eg space constraints prevent me from exploring the transparency implications of contract-based investor-state
disputes, whose dynamics are often closer to those of ordinary commercial arbitration. For views on transparency
in the international commercial arbitration context, see the articles in ‘Confidentiality versus Transparency in
International Arbitration’, Transnational Dispute Management, Special Issue (advance publication online, 7 March
2012). See also Catherine Rogers, ‘Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration’, University of Kansas Law
Review, 54 (2006), p. 1301.
33
UNCTAD maintains the most up-to-date compilation of bilateral investment treaties at:
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx. Key regional investment treaties and model
investment treaties may be accessed at: http://italaw.com/investmenttreaties.htm.
34
One example is Article 22 of Venezuela’s law on the promotion and protection of foreign investment (Law No.
356 of 3 October 1999), which has recently received wide publicity in the context of several investor-state
arbitrations, including Mobil v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on
Jurisdiction (June 10, 2010).
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contracts, the majority of the IIL regime’s rights-granting and jurisdiction-delimiting texts are, as
a general rule, publicly available.35
Transparency proponents have nevertheless found themselves unsatisfied with this state of
affairs, and understandably so. It is one thing to place existing investment treaties in the public
domain after-the-fact. It is quite another to render transparent the process by which such treaties
are concluded. Concerns linger because, until quite recently, major capital exporting countries
drafted boiler-plate investment treaty texts in closed processes controlled by internal agency
bureaucrats and arguably influenced by big business. Some of these texts then became the
templates for bilateral investment treaties that were often signed as ‘photo ops’ by visiting
dignitaries upon the occasion of official state visits. Recent scholarly work suggests that
thousands of investment treaties went into force in the 1990s with very little input into, or even
awareness of, the treaties on the part of either civil society or the legislative branches of many
countries.36
Inauspicious as these beginnings may seem, transparency has made significant inroads into the
treaty negotiating process in recent years. Thanks to the civil society outcry engendered by a
few notorious early NAFTA claims,37 the United States and Canada moved to introduce greater
openness into several aspects of the investment law regime. This gave rise to a new generation
of ‘model BITs’ whose proposed contents are routinely disclosed in advance by the responsible
government agencies and then revised in response to extensive public comment and legislative
review processes. Numerous countries have followed suit, instituting model BIT programs or
otherwise conducting public reviews of their investment treaty practices.38 The EU organs
recently endowed by the Lisbon Treaty with the competence to determine the EU’s future
investment treaty relations so far appear to be falling in line with this trend.39 Indeed, it seems
that the adoption of transparent processes for the drafting of investment treaty texts is quickly
becoming the norm, at least for democratic states.40
Should this practice eventually achieve universal acceptance, it would eliminate a notable
incongruity within the IIL system, since most investment treaties already impose substantive
transparency obligations upon host state governments in their dealings with foreign investors.41
Even where investment treaties lack explicit transparency obligations, scholars and arbitrators
often read implicit obligations into the texts by identifying transparency as a core component of
35

But see note 65 below and accompanying text.
For a persuasive empirical validation of this narrative of the diffusion of BITs, backed by qualitative accounts
from numerous investment treaty negotiators, see Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen & Emma Aisbett, ‘When the Claim
Hits: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bounded Rational Learning’, Crawford School Research Paper No. 5 (July 29,
2011), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1899342.
37
An overview is provided in Jack R. Coe Jr., ‘Transparency in the Resolution of Investor-State Disputes—Adoption,
Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership’, University of Kansas Law Review 54 (2006), p. 1339.
38
These include Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, India, Norway, South Africa, the UK, and the US.
Unless otherwise noted, all of the investment treaty texts and model texts cited herein are available for download
at
one
or
both
of
the
following
websites:
http://italaw.com/investmenttreaties.htm;
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx.
39
See generally Angelos Dimopoulos, EU Foreign Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), part II.
40
Not surprisingly, non-democratic governments have proven less responsive to this trend.
41
See eg US Model BIT 2012, article 11.
36
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either the treaty-based ‘fair and equitable treatment’ standard, the customary international lawbased ‘minimum standard of treatment’, or the general international law notions of ‘good
governance’ and the ‘rule of law’.42 Some of these reading-in exercises have invited
considerable critique.43 But most commentators now agree that the substantive law of
international investment does, at a minimum, require host states to disclose to foreign investors
the basic information concerning laws and regulations affecting their investments, both before
and after the investor’s initial commitment of capital.44 In light of this, substantive law may
represent the area of the IIL regime wherein transparency principles have penetrated deepest.
The forward march of transparency has been less sweeping on the institutional front.45
Information concerning the various arbitral institutions that play a role in investor-state
arbitration proceedings – including their basic operating structures and associated sets of
procedural rules – rests within the public domain.46 But beyond this bare minimum, the
transparency practices of the major institutions vary widely. NAFTA offers the most transparent
institutional support structure for investor-state dispute settlement. In 2001, the three NAFTA
state parties issued a ‘Note of Interpretation’ in which they made transparency the default norm
in all investor-state complaints brought under NAFTA chapter 11.47 As a result, the public now
has free access to a wealth of information concerning every NAFTA dispute, including the
composition of the tribunal, the memorials and pleadings of the parties (both written and oral),
decisions on challenges to arbitrators, and the orders and awards of the tribunal.48
ICSID has so far taken a more reserved approach to transparency. The Centre publishes on its
website basic procedural details concerning every dispute registered by the Secretariat,49 but the
revised 2006 ICSID Arbitration Rules still prohibit the Centre from publishing a tribunal’s award

42

Most famously, the Tecmed tribunal stated:
‘The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally
transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all rules
and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and
administrative practices or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations.’
Técnicas Medioamibiantales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May
29, 2003), para 154.
43
Particularly those which attempt to tie a host state’s transparency obligations to a particular investor’s
‘legitimate expectations’. See e.g. Jürgen Bering et al, International Law Association German Branch
Subcommittee on Investment Law Working Group, ‘General Public International Law and International Investment
Law, a Research Sketch on Selected Issues’, Beitrage zum Transnationalen Wirthschaftsrecht, pp. 21-22, available
at: http://www.50yearsofbits.com/docs/0912211342_ILA_Working_Group_IIL_PIL.pdf.
44
Even where a host state’s domestic law does not so require.
45
The extent to which this fact has attracted popular notice became clear with the publication of ‘Behind Closed
Doors, A hard struggle to shed some light on a legal grey area’, The Economist (Print Edition, 25 April 2009).
46
Details may be downloaded from the websites of the respective institutions.
47
Notes of Interpretation of Certain NAFTA Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA Free Trade Commission (July 31, 2001),
part A, available at: http://www.naftaclaims.com/files/NAFTA_Comm_1105_Transparency.pdf. See also Coe,
above note 37. Similar transparency requirements were later included in article 10.21 of the US-Dominican
Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) as well as article 29 of the 2012 US Model BIT.
48
Redactions may be made to protect confidential, privileged or otherwise protected information.
49
This includes the existence of a dispute, the composition of the arbitral tribunal, and the status of the
proceedings.
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in its entirety without the consent of both disputing parties.50 Such consent is usually
forthcoming in practice, with the result that most awards are published in full.51 Even when this
does not occur, the rules require ICSID to publish excerpts of the tribunal’s legal reasoning. The
oral and written submissions of the disputing parties and their experts and witnesses, by contrast,
almost always remain confidential. In this respect, ICSID’s institutional support for transparency
in investor-state arbitration lags behind that of NAFTA.
As to the other major institutional players, UNCITRAL is the only one that has recently
reviewed its transparency requirements for investor-state arbitration. At its 41st session in 2008,
the Commission recognized ‘the importance of ensuring transparency in investor-state dispute
resolution’.52 The Working Group tasked with implementing the Commission’s mandate met
numerous times over the course of several years, welcoming input not only from governmental
delegates but also from civil society organizations and industry associations. A few protransparency delegations – notably the US and Canada – advocated the adoption of NAFTA-like
transparency obligations for all future investor-state arbitrations to be conducted under the
UNCITRAL rules.53 But other delegations opposed this approach and instead favoured the
mandatory application of the new transparency requirements only on a prospective basis.54 In
the end, this latter position carried the day. The upshot is that the new UNICITRAL
transparency requirements will apply only in respect of investor-state claims arising out of any
treaties adopted after the enactment of the revised rules. All claims arising under the existing
universe of 3000 treaties will continue to be exempt from any transparency requirements unless
the disputing parties agree otherwise or unless the treaties are proactively amended by their
contracting state parties to explicitly incorporate the new rules.55 It remains to be seen whether
any states will actually take up the difficult task of treaty amendment so as to render the
UNCITRAL transparency reforms effective in practice.56
To summarize, then, the following major features of the IIL regime currently exhibit a high
degree of transparency: 1) the foundational texts which provide the architecture of the system
(including the ICSID and New York Conventions); 2) the contents of a large proportion of the
existing stock of bilateral and regional investment treaty texts and domestic investment statutes;
3) the model investment treaty-making processes employed prospectively by major developed
countries and increasingly also by democratic developing countries; 4) the content of the laws
and regulations imposed by host states upon foreign investors and their investments; and 5) the
conduct of investor-state dispute resolution proceedings and their outcomes under NAFTA and,
50

Rule 48(4), ICSID Arbitration Rules; Rule 53, ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules.
Often one or both parties will have an interest in disclosing the award, eg for enforcement or public relations
reasons, and nothing in the rules prevents the parties themselves (as opposed to the Centre) from doing so.
52
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Forty-first session, June 16-July 3, 2008,
para 314.
53
Most civil society observers to the Working Group’s sessions also took this position.
54
These delegations argued that superimposing mandatory new transparency requirements onto already existing
treaties would require an ‘evolutive’ interpretation of the existing treaties which would be impermissible under
the standard interpretive principles of international law. This argument was rejected by the US and Canada.
55
UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its fifty-eighth session (New
York, 4-8 February 2013), UN Doc. A/CN.9/765, paras 75-78.
56
Given the highly charged political climate surrounding the negotiation of investment treaties at present, the
prospects do not seem high.
51
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to a lesser extent, under ICSID. All of this readily available, accessible, and useful information
adds up to a sizeable body of public knowledge. It is a limited body, to be sure, and perhaps
difficult for the non-specialist to grasp, but it is significant nonetheless.
B. Semi-transparent aspects of the IIL regime (things most people could piece together if
they really wanted to)
So much for the generally known aspects of the IIL regime. A more interesting category
comprises things one could know about the international investment law system if only one tried
a little harder. I label such aspects of the IIL system ‘semi-transparent’ because – although the
raw information is out there – it is not readily available in a form that is useful to interested
stakeholders. This information comes in two basic types.
1. Information that is unnecessarily difficult to obtain
This type encompasses information which is public in principle but which can only be accessed
through opaque or unduly onerous procedures. The core problem, for purposes of my working
definition of transparency, is availability. To take an example, under article 102 of the United
Nations Charter, UN member states are required to deposit international treaties with the UN
Secretariat, which must, in turn, publish them.57 Where this is done, the treaties soon become
available for free download through the UN Treaty Series website and, in the case of investment
treaties, the online UNCTAD database.58
Yet many states are delinquent in notifying their investment treaties to either the UN Secretariat
or UNCTAD.59 In 2009, when a handful of South African civil society organizations sought to
review two treaties under which some European investors had challenged a portion of South
Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment legislation,60 they found themselves unable to locate the
treaties. To obtain them, the organizations had to lodge an application under South Africa’s
Promotion of Access to Information Act – an efficacious but time-consuming administrative
process.61 Even today, more than three years after the South African government launched a
public review of its investment treaty program, only 21 of South Africa’s reported total of 41
signed BITs are available on the UNCTAD website. This amounts to a 51% disclosure rate.62
57

Arguably this duty is not absolute, as many inter-state agreements on military cooperation, intelligence
gathering, etc routinely go unpublished. But the confidentiality rationales applicable to such agreements seem
inapposite in the case of economic treaties. Indeed, a major reason for the creation of the Bretton Woods
institutions was to remove inter-state economic relations from the realm of secretive and de-stabilizing political
wrangling by integrating them into an open and orderly international system of regulation.
58
See http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx. UNCTAD does not rely solely on the UN
Secretariat for its data. It also directly solicits the responsible governmental agencies within each UN Member
country on an annual basis, requesting a complete listing of each state’s investment treaties.
59
And in fulfilling similar obligations under domestic law.
60
Piero Foresti and Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Award, (4 Aug 2010),
paras 27-29.
61
One wonders how the European investors in Piero Foresti came to possess copies of the treaties. Perhaps they
had been published in the domestic governmental register of one of the investors’ home countries.
62
It may be that the majority of the undisclosed treaties are not yet in force, having been signed but not ratified. If
so, this offers scant comfort to stakeholders who wish to comment on whether those treaties should be ratified – a
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It is possible, of course, that South African practice is anomalous.63 But it must be noted that
South Africa’s treaty partners in this episode – Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
– had also failed to submit the treaties to any international body.64 And given the capacity
constraints faced by many developing country governments and the political disincentives to
disclosing potentially unpopular treaties, it seems likely that at least some other countries have
likewise failed to make all existing investment treaties internationally available. The magnitude
of the gap is probably not as negligible as many would presume.65 Whatever the number of nonnotified treaties may be, the IIL regime fails to meet the availability requirement of transparency
in respect of this portion of its textual underpinnings.
2. Information that is difficult to make use of
A second type of semi-transparent information consists of that which is not fully transparent
because it fails to satisfy contemporary standards of usefulness. It is here that the open-textured
adjectives from my working definition of transparency make their entrance, calling for an
evaluation of what constitutes ‘adequate’, ‘accurate’, ‘accessible’, and ‘relevant’ information.
Some concrete examples will help clarify the dilemmas raised by this type of semi-transparent
information.
Suppose one wanted to know how median arbitration costs or length of proceedings at ICSID
compared to those for comparable cases administered under the UNCITRAL or ICC rules. Most
arbitral institutions either don’t collect such information or don’t make it public.66 One would
need to download all of the available cases from a selection of websites, manually search through
each one for relevant passages, and then construct a database to analyze the information. This is
doable but highly labor-intensive.67 Yet this information is relevant to the public, since the cost
of conducting investor-state arbitration proceedings is paid, at least in part, out of the
government fisc.68

desire which seems particularly reasonable in respect of treaties that were originally negotiated without any public
comment or parliamentary input.
63
South Africa may have had a special incentive to withhold publication of its other treaties so as to dissuade other
potential challenges to its Black Economic Empowerment policies.
64
The two missing treaties have since been uploaded to the UNCTAD website.
65
UNCTAD officials were not at liberty to provide an official estimate. But sources familiar with UNCTAD’s
methodology, including country response rates and various political considerations hampering data collection,
suggest that UNCTAD’s database (the most comprehensive available) is most likely ‘significantly incomplete,
perhaps on the order of 30% missing’, particularly as regards signed-but-not-yet-ratified treaties.
66
ICSID, for example, publishes a biannual statistical update disclosing basic information concerning its case load
(eg number of claims registered and their geographic distribution). See ‘ICSID Caseload – Statistics’, available at:
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=CaseLoadStatistics.
Other
institutions issue similar reports.
67
No doubt this is why such research is presently performed only by those with a strong incentive to appropriate
the information in some fashion – whether for financial gain (law firms), personal prestige (academics), or
ideological influence (civil society organizations, including business lobbies).
68
Even where no damages are awarded, the costs of the arbitration are often divided between the disputing
parties unless one side has engaged in frivolous or vexatious behavior. For further detail, see Susan Franck,
‘Rationalizing the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration’, 88 Washington University Law Review 769 (2011).
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Similar challenges face anyone wishing to review qualitative or quantitative information
concerning: key aspects of institutional functioning within the IIL regime (including ethical
rules and conflict standards applied); prior disputes (claims and outcomes, trends in
interpretation, splits in the jurisprudence, areas of evolving consensus); funding sources (public,
private, and third-party); the arbitrators who decide investor-state disputes (their backgrounds,
training, areas of expertise, scholarly publications, record of previous arbitral appointments and
decisions); etc.
All of these facets of the IIL regime are relevant to states, to investors, and to the public at large.
They provide important information not only on the interrelationship between states’
international obligations to foreign investors and the scope of their domestic regulatory powers,
but also about the integrity and efficacy of the dispute resolution system which determines where
these lines are drawn. The difficulty with this type of information is that it’s not clear who
should bear the burden of packaging it in ways that prove useful to interested stakeholders.
Moreover, the packaging exercise itself can raise transparency concerns. There is a fine line
between disclosure and marketing. This is especially true where pre-digested information is
selectively released while the underlying raw data is withheld.69
C. Non-transparent aspects of the IIL regime (things the general public doesn’t know)
By definition, this category presents the greatest descriptive challenge, but thinking through the
problem conceptually can provide some starting points for the inquiry. Here again, I divide the
non-transparent aspects of the IIL regime into types. I employ the term ‘public’ to refer to
anyone who is unable to access the relevant information independently of any privileged,
confidential, or contractual relationship and independently of any personal or professional
acquaintance with a person who stands in such a relationship.70
1. Things the public has no right to know
Paradigmatic examples within this grouping include: trade secrets, confidential business
information, state secrets, information protected by professional or other legal privilege, etc.
Notwithstanding occasional alarmist protestations to the contrary, such information poses no
special difficulties for international investment law.71 Both the general principles of
international law and the various sets of arbitral rules employed in investor-state dispute
resolution allow for the protection of legally privileged information. 72 Within specific investorstate disputes, for example, protected information can be presented in camera, scrubbed from
publically published documents, and otherwise dealt with using the usual methods well-known to
69

One should never presume that non-specialists are incapable of processing specialized information.
This excludes, for example: parties to particular disputes; their counsel; arbitrators; arbitral law clerks; legal and
administrative personnel of arbitral institutions; and persons who, by virtue of their relationships with any of these
individuals, may become aware of the information.
71
This is not to say that privilege questions will not be contested, only that their resolution is no more difficult in
international investment law than in any other type of law.
72
Even where arbitration rules do not make these mechanisms explicitly available, arbitrators retain the option to
employ them under procedural discretion provisions. See e.g. article 17(1) of the 2010 revised UNCITRAL
arbitration rules (“Subject to these Rules, the arbitral tribunal may conduct the arbitration in such manner as it
considers appropriate…”).
70
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most domestic legal systems, as illustrated by current NAFTA practice. 73 As such, the topic of
protected information enters the transparency debate within international investment law
principally as a red herring. I therefore set it aside.
2. Things the public has reason to believe it should know, but cannot find out
The foregoing discussion has already hinted at some of the major contenders here. The lowhanging fruit is the subset of investment treaties that have neither been published domestically
nor internationally and that – unlike the South African treaties described above – cannot be
obtained through compulsory administrative processes. Here again, one can only speculate as to
the number of such treaties,74 yet their relevance to the public requires no speculation. Investors
have an interest in knowing what protections they enjoy within the territory of foreign states, and
citizens have a right to know how the scope or price of their governments’ regulatory powers
might be affected by the treaties.
Investors, states, and the general public have an equally strong interest in knowing how tribunals
conduct investor-state arbitration proceedings and how they interpret broadly applicable
international investment texts in practice. Whether one looks at the question from the
perspective of the rule of law, access to justice, public accountability, 75 or otherwise, it is
difficult to conceive a convincing reason why statute- or treaty-based investor-state arbitration
proceedings should not be conducted openly and transparently, subject to necessary measures for
the protection of privileged information.76 The worry that transparent proceedings might ‘repoliticize’ investor-state disputes seems misplaced in an era when public concern over intrusion
by ‘secret tribunals’ into sovereign regulatory powers is itself politicizing the disputes and
generating a popular backlash against the entire IIL regime.77 Indeed, a growing number of
commentators from the commercial arbitration world appear to accept that transparent
proceedings should be the norm in investor-state disputes.78 Some even suggest that many
investors would happily accept this if they could obtain the assurance of fairer and more
predictable dispute settlement in exchange.79
Yet under the most recent versions of the UNCITRAL (2010), ICC (2012), SCC (2010) and
LCIA (1998) arbitration rules, there is no institutional publication of any information pertaining
to the conduct of an arbitration proceeding unless both disputing parties agree otherwise. 80 Thus,
73

Mark Kantor, ‘The Transparency Agenda for UNCITRAL Arbitrations, Looking in All the Wrong Places’, Working
Paper, presented at the NYU Investment Law Forum, February 7, 2011, available at:
http://www.iilj.org/research/documents/IF2010-11.Kantor.pdf. pp. 18-20
74
See above notes 62 - 64.
75
Some tribunals have explicitly recognized such interests. See eg Aguas Argentinas SA, Suez, Sociedad General de
Aguas de Barcelona SA, and Vivendi Universal SA v the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in
Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae (19 May 2005), paras 19-23.
76
Purely contract-based claims may present different considerations.
77
Michael Waibel et al (eds), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer, 2010).
78
Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, p. 1308 (stating, ‘the right of public access seems
self-evident in the context of WTO proceedings and investor-state arbitration, where transparency is important to
the institutions' perceived legitimacy’).
79
Kantor, UNCITRAL Transparency, pp. 5-6.
80
Estimates as to the percentage of unpublished treaty-based investor-state awards range from five to 25%.

14

Maupin – Transparency in International Investment Law

not only the outcome but the very existence of an investor-state dispute may never be
disclosed.81 Further, the confidentiality provisions of these rules prohibit tribunals from ordering
the disclosure of the disputing parties’ pleadings and evidence without the parties’ consent.82
Some even prohibit the parties themselves from disclosing any information relating to the
arbitration unless both provide written consent or unless one party is under a legal obligation to
disclose.83 Interim orders, settlement agreements, and orders relating to discontinuation or
withdrawal of claims therefore likewise remain non-public.84
Of course, information about arbitral proceedings sometimes makes its way into the public
domain notwithstanding the absence of any formal transparency requirement. One of the parties
to a dispute may have an incentive to unilaterally disclose an arbitral award in order to tout its
victory. Or disclosure may be legally required, as in the case of reporting requirements imposed
by securities and exchange commissions or domestic laws requiring publication of all
government budget expenditures (including legal claims paid). In cases subject to the New York
Convention, obtaining satisfaction of an award often requires presenting it for recognition and
enforcement to the domestic courts of some enforcing state. Domestic courts take judicial notice
of relevant facts in the course of such proceedings, sometimes even placing the entirety of a
previously unpublished award on the record. As to the disputing parties’ pleadings, a noteworthy
development recently occurred under the ICSID Additional Facility rules, which (like ICSID’s
primary arbitration rules) neither mandate nor prohibit disclosure of parties’ pleadings. In a case
attracting widespread civil society interest, the tribunal in Piero Foresti v. South Africa ordered
the disputing parties to disclose their written pleadings to five non-governmental amicus
petitioners even over the claimants’ objections.85
Yet all such disclosures remain discretionary and are rarely complete. No binding directive
requires anyone to publish information within this category, and the public has no effective
means of demanding access to it, since the information’s very existence may be unknown. Thus,
despite the occurrence of substantial leakages, these aspects of the IIL regime remain largely
non-transparent.
81

For a critical appraisal of the ICC’s newly revised rules, see Gus van Harten, ‘A total lack of transparency: Why
responsible companies and governments should avoid the revised ICC rules in arbitrations involving states’,
Canadian Lawyer Magazine (24 Oct 2011), available at: http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/3912/a-total-lack-oftransparency.html.
82
See eg article 46 of the SCC rules.
83
See eg article 30.1 of the LCIA rules. Even where the rules do not prohibit parties from disclosing their own
pleadings or those of the opposing party, this is rarely done in practice. Unilateral disclosures tend to annoy
tribunals (who like to maintain control over such decisions), which may indirectly diminish the party’s prospects of
success. They could also subject the disclosing party to further legal claims, e.g. in the event that it inadvertently
discloses confidential business information or trade secrets.
84
In a notable development, the LCIA recently published scrubbed abstracts of decisions on challenges to
arbitrators under the LCIA rules in Arbitration International, vol. 27, no. 3, 2011. Challenge decisions are also
regularly published in NAFTA and ICSID proceedings but remain confidential in many other institutional settings.
See Gabriel Bottini, ‘Should Arbitrators Live on Mars? Challenge of Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration’, Suffolk
Transnational Law Review, 32 (2009), p. 341.
85
Piero Foresti and Others v. The Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Award, (4 Aug 2010),
paras 27-29. Note, however, that the disclosures never actually occurred, because the claimant opted to
discontinue the claim before (or rather than?) releasing the details of its claim to the public.
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3. Things the public might not realize it doesn’t know
I broach this final category not as one claiming to unveil some special body of insider
knowledge, but rather from the perspective of an avid student of international investment law
and a close observer of the regime’s functioning. One way to generate useful questions is to
consider the various features that make highly respected domestic judicial systems function well,
ask what counterparts these mechanisms may have in the international investment arbitration
world, and then evaluate whether the mechanisms are functioning in a transparent manner in the
latter context, given the differences between the two systems. With this in mind, I consider two
primary types of information under this heading.
a. Unwitting knowledge deficits
This type comprises things the public doesn’t know only because no one has ever thought to ask.
The individuals who belong to the IIL epistemic community might describe such information as
‘open secrets’. To those standing outside of this community, however, it is entirely opaque.
Much of the information chronicled in Dezalay and Garth’s classic book, Dealing in Virtue,86
which helped to demystify the international commercial arbitration world, is of this type.
Within the investment arbitration world, unwitting knowledge deficits abound in areas of
practical importance to the general public. One topic of current debate among IIL practitioners
concerns whether certain very active investment arbitrators are overextended. Commentators
worry that heavy arbitration dockets proliferate scheduling conflicts among three-person arbitral
panels, which in turn draws out the arbitration proceedings, delays drafting, and contributes to
the growing concern that the entire process is too expensive.
It should come as no surprise that the investment arbitration community has developed a panoply
of solutions to this dilemma. Some arbitrators open up boutique arbitration law firms and
employ full-time, salaried associates to handle all manner of tasks behind the scenes. Others hire
law student research assistants whom they pay at pre-set hourly rates. Still others engage no
assistants of their own but instead farm out various tasks to the legal counsel87 of whichever
institutional secretariat is administering the arbitration at-hand. The specific arrangements may
vary from one arbitration to the next, even in respect of the same arbitrator applying the same set
of arbitration rules and under the administrative auspices of the same arbitral institution.
There is nothing inherently untoward in any of these practices. Most governments provide
domestic judges with law clerks and other types of legal and administrative assistants to help
judges handle more cases in a shorter period of time. This does not impact the authoritativeness
of the ultimate decisions, which remain the responsibility of the decision-makers themselves
irrespective of whatever involvement their underlings may have had along the way. But unlike
the judicial setting, arbitrators are hired for their personal expertise and receive hefty sums for

86

Yves Dezalay & Brian Garth, Dealing in Virtue, International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a
Transnational Legal Order, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
87
Often the person designated on the award as the tribunal’s secretary.
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each day spent on a case.88 The manner in which arbitrators make use of associates, assistants,
and institutional secretariat personnel therefore has direct financial implications for taxpayers
whose governments become embroiled in investor-state disputes, for which the tribunal’s costs
alone have sometimes exceeded US $10 million.89 It could be that arbitrators who perform every
last scrap of work by themselves end up taking longer and costing disputing parties more than
those who outsource a significant number of tasks to junior persons (and bill fewer arbitrator
hours as a result). Or the converse might be true.
The difficulty, from a transparency standpoint, is that it is not presently possible to study the cost
or quality implications of different models. While some arbitrators’ assistance arrangements are
disclosed in writing before the disputing parties finalize their arbitrator appointments, many are
not. And even when they are disclosed in advance to the disputing parties, the information is not
often made available to the public at large.90
In short, the great diversity and general opacity of the practices, combined with the lack of
critical inquiry into their financial and ethical implications, turns this into an unwittingly nontransparent feature of the IIL regime. Similar examples could be given in respect of the inner
workings of arbitral institutions, the ethical practices followed by counsel and expert witnesses,
and numerous other topics debated within the IIL world.91
b. Intentional/strategic knowledge deficits
The information falling within this final class consists of things at least some people don’t want
the general public to know because they have strong incentives to keep the information private.
These tidbits are different from the previous category in that they come to light, if at all, only
when someone from inside the knowledge-holding community either slips up or revolts.
One high-profile example is the separate opinion penned by arbitrator Jan Hendrik Dalhuisen in
the Vivendi II annulment decision.92 Dalhuisen chastised the ICSID Secretariat for attempting to
act as a ‘fourth member’ of the tribunal even to the point of approaching individual tribunal
members ‘informally, with a view to amending the text’ of the tribunal’s award.93 He further
lambasted the Secretariat’s mistaken notion that it could act as ‘the voice of a jurisprudence
88

In ICSID administered cases, the standard rate is $US 3000.00 per day, although this is frequently negotiated up
in practice. ICSID Schedule of Fees (Jan 1, 2008), para 3.
89
This excludes the disputing parties’ own legal costs, counsel’s fees and any substantive damages as may be
awarded by the tribunal on the merits. See figures cited in Franck, above note 68, p. 785 and references cited
therein. Note that the arbitration costs must be paid irrespective of whether a claim succeeds or fails.
90
The ICC rules are unique in requiring assistants’ fees to be deducted from (rather than charged in addition to)
the institutionally-set schedule of arbitrators’ fees. Even so, the proportion of assistant to arbitrator fees need not
be disclosed.
91
The contents of various sets of existing and proposed ethical guidelines are well known, but this tells us little
about which guidelines are followed in practice. For an overview, see Omar García-Bolívar, ‘Comparing Arbitrator
Standards of Conduct in International Commercial, Trade and Investment Disputes’, in AAA Handbook on
International Arbitration.
92
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3 (Annulment Proceeding) (10 August 2010), Additional Opinion of Professor JH Dalhuisen.
93
Ibid, para 9.
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constante’ which somehow gave it an ‘autonomous right of intervention’,94 notwithstanding the
fact that international investment arbitration has no doctrine of formal precedent and that the
ICSID arbitration rules mandate the confidentiality of a tribunal’s internal deliberations. Several
prominent investment arbitrators were quick to contest Dalhuisen’s depiction of ICSID’s general
practices, which raises questions as to the generalizability of his observations. Even so, his
remarks illustrate the type of information which could potentially tarnish the reputations or
livelihoods of those in the know and which may be, for that reason, kept tightly under wraps.
Other examples prove less unseemly when viewed through the comparative lens of domestic
judicial practice. For instance, the international law firms with the largest and most lucrative
investment arbitration practices have amassed a great body of knowledge over time concerning
the personal characteristics of individual arbitrators, including: which ones are easiest to work
with; which are most effective at persuading their co-arbitrators; which are most and least likely
to keep a case on schedule; etc. To some extent this knowledge is unfairly augmented by the
firms’ access to unpublished arbitral awards, already discussed above; the remainder can be
chalked up to pure experience, in the same manner that domestic trial lawyers become familiar
with the personal characteristics of judges presiding in specific jurisdictions over time. Here
again we encounter a non-transparent body of information which the information holders have a
clear financial incentive not to disseminate broadly – it gives them an advantage when potential
clients are looking to hire counsel. Yet few would suggest that law firms should be forced to
disclose, in the name of transparency, the product of their lawyers’ cumulative experience.
Clearly, some normative guidance is needed. It is to this quest that the next part turns.
III.

Some considerations for future prescriptive analyses

Given what we now know about the major transparent, semi-transparent, and non-transparent
aspects of the international investment law system, how should we think about transparency as a
norm within that system? Three things are certain. First, the IIL regime’s existing transparency
practices are diverse. Second, the regime is too complex, decentralized, and multi-faceted to
allow for the simple implementation of transparency principles across-the-board. Third,
replacing this complex system with a simpler, more unified one from the ground up (as some
have suggested) remains politically out of reach, at least for the foreseeable future.95
Yet throwing in the towel hardly seems an appropriate response. A better approach would be to
think through the six interrelated prongs of the IIL regime identified at the outset – namely, its
textual, substantive, institutional, jurisprudential, political, and sociological components – and
consider how to leverage each of these in ways that promote the adoption of stakeholdersensitive transparency practices within each corner of the system. To help kick-start the
conversation, I offer here a roadmap of possible strategies to explore.
1. Moderation
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Ibid, para 16.
For a catalog of failed attempts to create a multilateral investment regime, see Andrew Newcombe and Lluís
Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2009), ch. 1.
95
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Productive debates about how to implement appropriate transparency practices will continue to
falter for as long as vocal segments of the IIL epistemic community cling to the masts of sinking
ships. The time has come to deal in facts. The continual demonization of investment arbitrators
and practitioners by some in the NGO community is as unhelpful as the irrational insistence – by
some in the arbitral community – that arbitral proceedings cannot be conducted transparently
without compromising investors’ confidential business information. Rather than beginning at
opposite poles, both sides would do better to work outwards from their common concern that the
IIL regime’s transparency deficiencies are undermining its legitimacy and credibility.
2. Innovation
The North American experience with the IIL regime has shown that complexity need not be a
recipe for paralysis. The United States and Canada have found ways to respond to public
concerns over opaque investment treaty drafting practices by developing new model BIT
processes that allow the public to monitor and participate in drafting debates. Likewise, the three
NAFTA state parties were able to make transparent proceedings the default for investor-state
claims under NAFTA by issuing an authoritative ex-post interpretation of the treaty. Prospective
innovations of this kind may be resisted at first, but with time they gain both momentum and
acceptance. Innovation thus represents a viable strategy for states in concluding, re-negotiating,
and authoritatively interpreting their investment treaties and statutes,96 particularly where civil
society organizations actively support these efforts.
3. Cooperation
Some of the regime’s problems of information usability and accessibility are already being
partially addressed by a patchwork of voluntary efforts. The ICSID Secretariat releases a semiannual report detailing statistics on its activities, including cases registered and administered,
sources of investor-state claims, regional and sectoral distribution of claims, arbitrator countries
of origin, and dispute outcomes by type.97 This is by far the most comprehensive of the
institutionally compiled reports.98 Yet it omits key items of interest, such as length of
proceedings, administrative fees, tribunal costs, and amounts claimed and awarded.
Scholars are increasingly stepping in to fill the gaps.99 The younger generation of scholars, in
particular, is spearheading a wave of innovative efforts to improve the transparency of
information on: investment treaties and investor-state contracts,100 the selection and performance
of arbitrators,101 trends in arbitral jurisprudence,102 and the ways in which normative values
96

Anthea Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Dual Role of States’, American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 104, p. 179 (2010).
97
See, most recently, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics (Issue 2012-1), at:
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadSta
tistics=True&language=English31.
98
The ICC, by contrast, publicly reports only the annual percentage of ICC administered cases that involved a state
party, without further detail.
99
Susan Franck has been a leader in this effort. See eg above, note 68.
100
See above, notes 9 and 36.
101
Sergio Puig, ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, European Journal of International Law, vol. 25
(forthcoming, 2014) (using network analytics to map the social networks of investment arbitrators); Michael
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impact perceptions of fairness in investor-state arbitration proceedings,103 among other topics.
All of these efforts remain hampered by lack of access to unpublished data, but they do promise
to improve the accessibility and salience of what data is presently available. UNCTAD,
meanwhile, has also been proactive in disseminating data on investment treaties and the
development impacts of different types of investment promotion strategies.104 Given its mandate
as a ‘neutral’ intergovernmental organization, it may be best placed to play a coordinating role
among the various academic, institutional, and governmental efforts to overcome the IIL
regime’s deficiencies of information usability, accessibility, and relevance.
4. Reputation
One often overlooked feature of the IIL regime is the extent to which it depends upon reputation
for its survival. Both investment arbitrators and the arbitral institutions that support the industry
have a vested interest in maintaining their reputations for impartiality and fair dealing lest
investors or states decide to eschew their services. This suggests that many issues of the
‘unwitting knowledge deficits’ sort might be brought to light by a series of new Dezalay and
Garth type studies focusing specifically on investment arbitration and taking account of its
unique public dimensions. This approach could prove particularly fruitful in respect of
informational deficiencies that touch upon ethical questions, such as arbitrator conflict
disclosures, scheduling practices, policies on ex parte communications, etc.105 One drawback is
that many of the information holders may be reluctant to speak candidly on the record. Still,
anonymous information is better than no information. And as scholars shed more empirical light
on various aspects of the regime’s functioning, the epistemic community’s ‘inner circle’ will
have greater incentives to discuss these openly.
5. Competition
A final consideration to bear in mind is the degree to which competitive dynamics drive
transparency practices within the IIL regime. This factor is especially relevant for institutions.
Of the six arbitration-related institutions known to play the largest roles in the world of investorstate dispute resolution, three are intergovernmental in nature (ICSID, UNCITRAL, and the
PCA) while three are private bodies (the SCC, ICC, and LCIA). Many of the 3000-plus existing
Waibel and Yanhui Wu, ‘Are Arbitrators Political?’, Working Paper (on file with author) (examining empirical trends
in arbitral outcomes as a function of arbitrators’ backgrounds).
102
Gus Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints: Judicial Restraint in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, (forthcoming, Oxford University Press) (using content analysis to examine trends in arbitral reasoning).
Susan Franck also makes her data on the evolving investor-state arbitral jurisprudence publicly available at:
http://law.wlu.edu/faculty/page.asp?pageid=1185.
103
Daniel Behn, a PhD candidate at the University of Dundee, is using Q-survey methodology to study the
‘Subjectivity of Values in Legal Discourse: Configurative Jurisprudence, Q Methodology, and the Fairness of
Investment Treaty Arbitration’.
104
See the various publications listed at:
http://www.unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20%28IIA%29/International
-Investment-Agreements-%28IIAs%29.aspx.
105
For an overview of some key ethical issues and ethics guidelines, see Omar E. García-Bolívar, ‘Comparing
Arbitrator Standards of Conduct in International Commercial, Trade and Investment Disputes’, in AAA/ICDR
Handbook on International Arbitration Practice (Juris, 2010).
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investment treaties allow investors, at their sole option, to select among several possible
institutional settings when initiating arbitration against a host state.106 Therefore, to the extent
that institutional transparency practices may impact upon investors’ forum preferences,
arbitration-related institutions have strong incentives to adopt practices that will maximize their
chances of attracting investor-state claims. It remains unclear whether the institutions’ best
strategy will be to harmonize or to differentiate in the future. Much will depend upon the degree
to which states signal their continued willingness to arbitrate investor-state disputes under nontransparent procedural rules as well as the reputational costs exacted by civil society campaigns
against ‘secretive’ arbitral institutions. This underscores how the five strategies outlined in this
section will be mutually determinative in practice.
IV.

Whence and whither transparency in international investment law? The good,
the bad, and the murky.

Transparency within international investment law has come a long way in a short period of time.
In the pre-NAFTA era of only 18 years ago, it seems fair to say that opacity was the norm and
transparency the exception. Today the situation is mixed. The investment treaty-making process
has become much more transparent, particularly in the developed world but also increasingly in
democratic countries within the developing world. Investor-state arbitration has likewise
become more transparent on the whole. Thanks to the transparency reforms enacted in the
NAFTA and ICSID contexts, the majority of investor-state arbitral awards are now publicly
available. Given ICSID’s apparent sensitivity to stakeholder perceptions of its legitimacy107 and
its demonstrated responsiveness to arbitrator-led transparency innovations in the past,108 the
smart money might be on further movements in the direction of an increasing institutionalization
of transparency requirements at ICSID.
The fact that arbitrators have at times been the progenitors of transparency innovations is also
encouraging. UNCITRAL’s recent review of the appropriate practices to apply in investor-state
cases shows that it, too, is sensitive to the growing demand for transparency within the regime –
at least on a prospective basis. Meanwhile, more and more scholars are paying attention to
transparency problems, and civil society critiques continue to add urgency to the debate. All of
these developments are to be lauded.
The bad news is that, despite much progress, many corners of the IIL regime remain shrouded in
darkness. From unpublished treaties and arbitration awards to basic information concerning
costs and ethics, semi-transparencies and non-transparencies abound in areas that are of real
106

This stands in contrast to investor-state contracts, whose dispute resolution clauses tend to be symmetrical.
But treaties, not contracts, form the basis for most contemporary investor-state claims. See e.g. The ICSID
Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2012-1, p. 10 (showing treaty-based claims made up 80% of total ICSID claims through
end of 2011).
107
See ICSID Secretariat, Discussion Paper, ‘Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration’ (22 Oct
2004), available at: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp (proposing changes to the ICSID
arbitration rules and the possible creation of an ICSID appellate body in response to concerns over transparency,
third-party participation, and inconsistent arbitral awards).
108
ICSID’s 2006 rule revisions included a new rule explicitly authorizing written amicus submissions after two ICSID
tribunals had already exercised their discretionary authority to do so. See Rule 37, ICSID Arbitration Rules; Rule
41(3), ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules.
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importance to the public. The complexity of the IIL regime compounds and sometimes even
creates these problems, making it difficult to remedy the regime’s transparency deficits on
anything other than a piecemeal basis.
We are left with a broad swath of murky territory in which it is not yet possible to know whether
transparency can or will prevail. Not all of the possible strategies have yet been attempted, let
alone exhausted. How much of the presently non-transparent information to which the public
should have access can be made transparent simply by asking for it? How much of the
information which is currently available but not useful can be rendered fully transparent by
pursuing cooperative data analysis arrangements between governments, institutions, and
scholars? We will never know until we try. For now, the ultimate fate of transparency as an
overarching norm within international investment law remains to be determined. Only time will
tell whether public support for the international investment law regime will rise or fall alongside
of it.
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